Witnesses say it’s a grey sedan.

A grey four-door sedan — occupied by two men.

A grey four-door sedan occupied by two men that shows up at railroad facilities.

The men claim to work for the Federal Railroad Administration. That say they are there to inspect a bridge, or to observe train and engine crews switching tank cars in a yard.

But when asked for their identification, the two men immediately drive away in their grey sedan.

That’s the story told by a Canadian Pacific railroad bridge tender in Milwaukee, Wis., and 31 hours later by a Union Pacific supervisor 2,100 miles southwest of Milwaukee at a UP yard in Long  Beach, Calif., where tank cars were being switched.

Although the bridge tender notified Canadian Pacific police, and the UP supervisor notified the FRA – both providing a description of the vehicle and the two occupants — neither was able to obtain the vehicle’s license plate number.

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is investigating. The FRA said that in neither of the reported incidents were their employees nearby.

For it to be the same vehicle and same pair of men in Milwaukee and Long Beach — 2,100 miles apart — they would have had to travel non-stop at 68 mph for 31 hours.

So, could they be separate sets of federal officers in a similar sedan testing security awareness? If not, then …?

It’s the, “If not, then … ?” that is so properly worrisome in this era of worldwide terror attacks.

The FRA and TSA continue to remind front-line rail employees that they are the critical eyes and ears first able to spot and report potential terrorist activity.

Advises the FRA and TSA:

* Request credentials of any person claiming to be an official government inspector, law-enforcement officer or representative.

* When observing a suspect vehicle, record its description (type, color, make, model, number of doors) and license plate number.

* Stay vigilant for suspicious people, behaviors, activities, and objects at and near rail facilities.

* Report potential security concerns to the railroad’s communications or operations center, following individual railroad procedures for such reporting.

* Review these procedures with other employees and supervisors during awareness briefings.

Bruce Feltmeyer

The UTU and the Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis (TRRA) are jointly seeking an anti-terrorist security grant from the Department of Homeland Security (DHS).

If the grant is approved — with a DHS decision expected in August — the UTU and TRRA will collaborate on a three-year project to train front-line TRRA employees to enhance security awareness.

The project — with International employee Bruce Feltmeyer (UTU Local 1402, St. Louis) leading the UTU team — proposes joint UTU/TRRA creation of a security awareness manual, plus emergency preparedness classroom training, drills and exercises that will present various terrorist scenarios and means of recognizing, reporting and responding to terrorist threats against TRRA facilities.

The TRRA is a major railcar switching facility, with yards in downtown St. Louis and in the shadows of the Gateway Arch.

Daily, carloads of hazardous materials and other security-sensitive cargo are interchanged among most major railroads by TRRA train and engine workers. “The nature of TRRA’s operation, its importance to national rail-network reliability, and its location in the heart of a major U.S. city could make TRRA a high-priority target for foreign terrorists as well as disturbed individuals,” Feltmeyer said.

The UTU is currently working with Amtrak to develop training of conductors, assistant conductors, on-board service personnel and yard employees to enhance their abilities to recognize behavioral traits and deal with unruly passengers. That project is funded with forfeiture proceeds from federal drug-busts.

Additionally, discussions are underway with Class I freight railroads regarding joint UTU/railroad applications for federal grants to develop similar training programs for front-line Class I employees.

Feltmeyer, who is administrative assistant to UTU International President Mike Futhey, says the knowledge and understanding of vulnerability demonstrated by TRRA Police Chief George Muraski and former Amtrak Police Chief Ron Frazier will ““help to make a strong case for DHS funding of this joint UTU/TRRA project.”

At UTU regional meetings in San Antonio, Texas, and New York City in June and July, Feltmeyer will lead educational workshops on recognizing, reporting and responding to terrorist threats.

“Bruce Feltmeyer is uniquely qualified for this leadership task,” Futhey said. “During his years of rail service, he has developed training programs for the on-line UTU University; and, as a Union Pacific employee, he helped to develop customer-service related training materials for conductors and newly hired managers.

“Bruce also taught business software as an adjunct professor at a St. Louis community college,” Futhey said.

The news media may be atwitter with concerns of an al-Qaida attack on trains, but there is no validation that any specific attack is imminent or has been planned.

What is crucial is that each of us — whether we work for an air, bus, freight train, transit or passenger train operator — remains alert, observant and prepared to report whatever appears out of the ordinary around yards, terminals and rights-of-way.

This is a meaningful reminder to review with fellow workers and supervisors your carrier’s procedures for reporting safety and security concerns.

If you have not heard or read the news, intelligence gathered from the Pakistan compound where Osama bin Laden was killed indicates al-Qaida had considered — but not necessarily planned — a terrorist attack on trains this coming Sept. 11, which will be the 10th anniversary of 9/11.

The New York Times reports it “confirmed” that documents obtained from the bin Laden compound “include a discussion of tampering with tracks to derail a train on a bridge.” But the newspaper added, “There was no evidence of a specific plot.”

Terrorist threats are not limited to al-Qaida, and domestic terrorism also is a possibility.

In October 1995, two locomotives and eight cars of Amtrak’s Sunset Limited derailed near Palo Verde, Ariz., on Southern Pacific (now Union Pacific) tracks, with four cars tumbling 30-feet from a trestle bridge into a dry river bed, killing a sleeping car attendant and injuring 78 passengers.

The FBI said sabotage likely was the cause, finding the rails had been shifted out of position and the track circuit closed to prevent signals from alerting the operating crew.

That act of terrorism was similar to one in 1939 in Carlin, Nev., which killed 24 passengers aboard the City of San Francisco passenger train operating over Southern Pacific track.

Neither the 1995 nor 1939 act of sabotage was solved by law enforcement.

The Department of Homeland Security said May 5, “We have no information of any imminent terrorist threat to the U.S. rail sector. We want to stress that this alleged al-Qaida plotting is based on initial reporting, which is often misleading or inaccurate and subject to change.”

New organizations also report that other materials found at the bin Laden compound indicate a desire to target major mass-transit hubs, similar to attacks that have occurred in India, Spain and the United Kingdom.

(The following is a security alert from the UTU’s Rail Safety Task Force.)

Rail security remains a constant threat to the nation’s railroads and our members. President Futhey wrote of this concern in a recent leadership message, “We need training to spot trouble.”

Based on recent events, the UTU’s Rail Safety Task Force strongly encourages all railroaders to remain vigilant in our effort to recognize potential threats.

That message was hammered home at a recent FRA hazardous materials seminar in Hot Springs, Ark. The hazardous materials specialist told a chilling story of a recent routine inspection of a rail yard.

The FRA specialist was approached by a conductor and asked, “Are you back again? We were just inspected a few days ago.”

The FRA specialist inquired about the suspicious individual’s description and what happened. Immediately, he realized that the FRA had no one in the region that fit the description.

The facts became more chilling.

When the possible terrorist was asked by a crew member as to whom he was, the individual flipped out a badge and quickly closed it without giving the crew member an opportunity to inspect it. The suspicious individual went as far as to inquire about the chemicals vinyl chloride and ammonia nitrate — if there were any cars in the yard with those chemicals, and the frequency they were there.

With rail crews subjected to physical abuse, robberies and threats from public trespassers, the potential for a breach in security seems to be trending in the wrong direction.

The UTU Rail Safety Task Force reminds our members to focus on the following:

KNOW YOUR WORKSITE: Know your area officers, co-workers, FRA and TSA inspectors — if not personally, at least by name or face.

If a person or vehicle looks out of place, and you are unsure of who an individual is, or if suspicions arise for any reason, follow your railroad’s guidelines to ensure that person remains on the property. In many cases this may involve contacting the proper authority to handle the threat.

All federal agents are required to present proper identification upon request. In cases of trespassers, caution should always be taken and it may be best to let those authorized to handle such situations handle them.

 MAINTAIN SITUATIONAL AWARENESS: Be aware of suspicious individuals and items. We generally travel and work the same areas. If something looks out of place, report it immediately. Do not leave a potential threat for others to handle.

Be aware of high risk locations, such as fuel facilities, hazardous materials cars, radio towers, and dimly lit areas. Make sure to inspect safety appliances and use them if they are required.

Inspect all locks, gates, doors and derails that are used as safety devices, and report those that are found to be damaged or missing to the proper authority.

As always, our first line of defense is ensuring that any issues that may impair our personal safety are properly handled in an expedient manner. Those on the ballast see or hear it first, and it is those on the ballast who are most in harm’s way.

For more information on the UTU Rail Safety Task Force, click below:

http://utu.org/utu-rail-safety-task-force/

In solidarity,

UTU Rail Safety Task Force

Greg Hynes, UTU Arizona state legislative director

Steve Evans, UTU Arkansas state legislative director

Jerry Gibson, UTU Michigan state legislative director

By UTU International President Mike Futhey

The recent tragic, senseless and violent murder in New Orleans of CSX conductor Fred Gibbs, and wounding of the train’s engineer (a potential witness whose name is being withheld), accelerates an already urgent need for better workplace safety and security measures for rail, transit and motor coach facilities and operations.

Gibbs and the engineer were shot by a lone gunman (a suspect is in police custody) inside the cab of their intermodal train parked on a dark and isolated stretch of track as it awaited dispatcher clearance to enter a yard in New Orleans. The motive appears to have been robbery of the crew, but the train could have contained a cargo of chlorine gas or other deadly hazmat, and the shooter could have been a terrorist or delusional individual with knowledge of locomotive operations.

Indeed, prior to 9/11, few, if any, envisioned terrorists capable of hijacking and piloting multiple sophisticated passenger aircraft and flying them into high-profile targets; or of terrorists in Madrid, Spain, who coordinated four separate rush-hour bombings aboard packed commuter trains in March 2004.

Many of our members noted immediately after the New Orleans shooting that federal regulations do not require bullet-proof glass in locomotives, tamper-proof and functioning locomotive door locks, “keyed” or electronic safeguards that limit locomotive operation to licensed train and engine workers, or train scheduling and dispatching that restricts the stopping of trains to well-lighted and protected areas.

Certainly these are logical responses to the New Orleans shooting.

But without more expert study and collaboration among experts at the Federal Railroad Administration, Federal Transit Administration, Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration, Transportation Security Administration, the National Transportation Safety Board, law enforcement agencies, carriers and labor organizations representing rail, transit and bus employees, we could be overlooking other effective safeguards.

Transportation labor long has been ahead of the curve in calling for greater collaboration among stakeholders, which includes front-line employee training to recognize threats and learn how best to report concerns to dispatchers and law enforcement.

In fact, Amtrak and the UTU recently agreed to a joint project that, in cooperation with the Transportation Security Administration, directs almost $300,000 in federal funding to the UTU to devise and implement a training program for conductors, assistant conductors, engineers, on-board service personnel and yard employees to enhance their abilities to recognize behavioral traits of individuals intending to engage in terrorist-like activity.

The UTU is now reaching out to build on this program to effectuate workplace safety as it pertains to terrorist and delusional activities.

We are seeking collaboration among other concerned labor organizations, federal safety and homeland security agencies, and carriers to create an incubator for effective ideas on a comprehensive security action plan, including employee training, that can be presented to Congress for fast-track federal funding.

We are heartened by word from CSX that it has begun a cooperative security venture with other carriers and law enforcement agencies to increase security around interchanges and loops in New Orleans.

The potential threat, however, is nationwide; and as train and engine employees, and bus drivers, are constantly in the cross-hairs of danger as well as being the eyes and ears best and first able to recognize threats, it is essential that transportation labor organizations be an integral part of any effort to improve rail, transit and bus security.

Historically, transportation labor and the carriers have been most successful in achieving policy goals when they act in concert. Where carriers or labor act separately — and often at odds with each other — success often is elusive or falls short of goals.

For any action plan to be effective, all parties with accountability and responsibility must collaborate in the creation and implementation of that plan.

We will be reporting more on this effort in the near future.